“With the benefit of hindsight I think we didn’t quite understand the sheer scale and complexity of a project of this scale,” Bernadette Kelly admitted to the Public Accounts Committee. “There are some incredibly important lessons that my department and anyone involved in major project delivery need to learn to avoid a repeat of mistakes going forward.”

She added: “It is clearly deeply disappointing that we are where we are on this project, and I understand the frustration of the committee and others including taxpayers feel on escalation of costs.”

Bernadette Kelly was asked what went wrong with High Speed 2. “The budget and schedule were set far too early, and risk and complexity had been underestimated through the lifetime of the project,” she replied. “I think there has been over optimism at a number of critical points as to the efficiency that could be delivered.”

Huw Merriman MP – who chairs the Transport Select Committee and was a guest at the session – pointed out that the HS2 annual report in July 2019 did not mention the word ‘delay’ once, “and yet all of a sudden it blows up. When was the Department aware and why was there little transparency? It reads very differently to the National Audit Office report six months later.”

Bernadette replied: “All through 2019 we did know there were significant cost pressures which we hoped could be managed.” She added: “We were exploring options to bring (the project) within cost and were contemplating change to the budget. Ministers had not determined the right way forward.”

Later in the session she was asked to outline what lessons from current transport schemes could be applied to other projects in future. “Learning lessons has become a bit of an obsession of mine when it comes to major project delivery,” she replied. “We are now using realistic ranges for cost and schedule, rather than fixed points that are over ambitious.”

She was asked if that amounted to being more “forgiving” when it comes to cost over runs. “I don’t think this is about being more forgiving,” the Permanent Secretary replied. “It is about being more realistic and recognising genuine uncertainty.

“What we would expect to see with ranges is, as the project progresses, they will narrow. So it is not just creating latitude for cost increases, its about being realistic. We cannot say with absolute certainty exactly what risks will crystalise and exactly how every cost will fall, 10 years out.”

Also appearing at the Parliamentary session was High Speed 2’s chief executive Mark Thurston, who was asked for an update on works at Euston. He said the number of platforms at the station had yet to be decided, which will inform whether a single or two stage build process in necessary.

“Eighteen trains per hour at peak into Euston assumes an 11 platform station,” he said, which will mean building the eastern half first, followed by the west.

However, if a decision is taken to reduce to 10 platforms to accommodate 16 trains an hour, “we can build the station in one phase, which has much less impact to the national rail station”.

Mark added that the existing Underground station at Euston is expected to be connected to nearby Euston Square, but a key decision regarding passenger movements will be around what happens with Crossrail 2.

He was asked how big an impact High Speed 2 works will have on Tube services. “We wouldn’t expect it to make any difference; our assumption is as it is today,” he replied.

(Image: Grimshaw Architects)